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Abstract 
It is a common view that private information in the foreign exchange market 
does not exist. We provide evidence against this view. The evidence comes 
from the introduction of trading in Tokyo over the lunch-hour. Lunch re-
turn variance doubles with the introduction of trading, which cannot be due 
to public information since the flow of public information did not change 
with the trading rules. Having eliminated public information as the cause, 
we exploit the volatility pattern over the whole day to discriminate between 
the two alternatives: private information and pricing errors. Three key re-
sults support the predictions of private-information models. First, the vola-
tility U-shape flattens: greater revelation over lunch leaves a smaller share 
for the morning and afternoon. Second, the U-shape tilts upward, an impli-
cation of information whose private value is transitory. Finally, the morning 
exhibits a clear U-shape when Tokyo closes over lunch, and it disappears 
when trading is introduced. 
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Is There Private Information in the FX Market? 
The Tokyo Experiment 
It is a common view that all participants in the foreign exchange market are 
projecting on the same public information set. A corollary is that private informa-
tion is irrelevant. This paper provides evidence against this view. The evidence 
comes from the Tokyo foreign exchange (FX) market, which until recently was 
restricted from trading over the lunch break (12:00 to l:30).1 For that ninety 
minutes the Tokyo interbank market shut down. In 1994, however, the restriction 
was abolished. This market opening provides new insights into why return volatility 
is so much higher during trading hours.2 
Why trading increases volatility is central to the theory of price formation. 
Three candidate explanations have been proposed: (1) public information arrives 
primarily during trading hours, (2) private information induces trades that affect 
price during trading hours, and (3) errors in pricing are more likely to occur during 
trading hours. To discriminate among them, French and Roll (1986) examine stock 
market closures for which the flow of public information does not change. They find 
that return volatility decreases during these closures. Since public information 
cannot be the cause, they examine the two alternatives. Finding only a small role 
for pricing errors, they conclude that private information is the main source of high 
trading-time volatility on the NYSE. 
The analysis of this paper has two stages. The first stage is similar in spirit 
to the analysis of French and Roll in that we compare volatility across regimes with 
1
 This t rading hour restriction was imposed by The Committee of Tokyo Foreign Exchange Market 
Customs, which is composed of representatives from commercial banks, foreign banks, and FX 
brokers. It was thus a voluntary regulation by market participants rather than Ministry of Finance 
guidance. The restriction was introduced in 1972 after the yen exited the Bretton Woods system. 
The reason the restriction was abolished—according to news reports—was to regain volume t h a t h a d 
migrated to other, unrestricted locations (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore). The decision to lift the 
restriction was made on December 21, and implemented on the following day. Restrictions on t rading 
before 9 a.m. and after 3:30 p.m. were also abolished on December 22. 
2
 For evidence on equity returns see Fama (1965), Oldfield and Rogalski (1980), and French and Roll 
(1986), among others. For FX see Meese (1986) and Hertzel et al. (1990). 
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an unchanged flow of public information. Our first-stage analysis differs in an 
important way, however: we are addressing a market whose information structure is 
skewed toward public information. In FX, for example, there is no plausible 
analogue to the inside information so common to equity markets. Nevertheless, the 
result is similar to French and Roll's: lunch return variance doubles when trading 
opens. Given public information's role in this market, that this information is far 
from the whole story is all the more striking.3 
Whether the flow of public information over lunch was the same across 
regimes is clearly important for interpreting our results. We offer three key 
background facts. First, the decision to abolish the restriction on trading was not 
part of a broader policy-reform package; rather, it was an isolated change in regime. 
Second, the decision was not the work of the Ministry of Finance (footnote 1); it is 
thus less likely to have correlated with this Ministry's policy more generally. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, we have reviewed the schedule of public 
release of relevant macro data and find no change within our sample either toward 
or away from the lunch hour.4 
Having eliminated public information as the cause of higher lunch volatility, 
we discriminate between the two alternatives — private information and pricing 
errors — by examining volatility changes in the morning and afternoon. Since 
intraday volatility patterns could not be addressed in earlier work on closures, this 
second stage of our analysis is the main contribution of the paper. It links naturally 
to work on intraday volatility, which documents a U-shape that is common to many 
markets.5 Recent theory rationalizes the U-shape using private information of 
3
 The fact tha t many markets exhibit relatively low volatility over the lunch period does not weaken 
this result since we are measuring the change in volatility from the change in regime; we are not 
making a s tatement about the absolute level. 
4
 That scheduled public releases did not change is necessary but not sufficient since the timing of 
release of much public information is endogenous and may correlate with the change in trading rules. 
Accordingly, we checked the number of news reports over the 12-1:30 period on the Reuters Money 
Market Headline News screen. In the thirty trading days before the lunch opening there were 18.5 
reports on average. In the thirty trading days after the lunch opening there were 17.5 reports on 
average (precise dates correspond to our sampling convention, described below). Thus, if anything, 
this suggests a bias against finding an increase in lunch variance in our sample. Note tha t endoge-
nous public information flow is also an issue in the French and Roll paper since their Wednesday 
closes were known in advance. 
5
 Evidence of the U-shape pat tern of intraday volatility appears in Wood, Mclnish, and Ord (1985), 
Harris (1986), and Andersen and Bollerslev (1994), among many others. 
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various types.6 Empirical work, however, only recently progressed from document-
ing the U-shape to determining if private information is indeed involved (see, e.g., 
Foster and Viswanathan 1993). Here we link the U-shape to information by 
comparing the U-shape before and after the introduction of lunch-hour trading. 
Private-information models make a number of predictions we are able to test. For 
example, common specifications predict a flattening of the U-shape: lunch-hour 
trading induces greater revelation during that period, leaving a smaller share for 
the morning and afternoon. 
The second-stage analysis produces three sharp results that support the 
private-information hypothesis. First, the volatility U-shape over the full day does 
flatten, as predicted by the private-information models. Second, the U-shape over 
the full day also tilts upward, which suggests information whose private value is 
transitory: an open lunch hour reduces the incentive to trade early since it reduces 
the likelihood that price will reflect that information before a position can be opened. 
Finally, we find a clear U-shape in the morning trading session when Tokyo closes 
over lunch. This morning U-shape disappears with the lunch opening, exactly as the 
private-information models predict. 
Of course, consistency with the private-information alternative does not rule 
out mispricing. Indeed, the question addressed here is whether private information 
exists in this market, not whether mispricing does not exist. Taken together, our 
results make a strong case for private information's existence: we know of no 
models of mispricing, with either rational or irrational agents, that can explain all 
our results. To do so, a model of mispricing would have to generate not only an 
intraday U-shape, but also predict how that U-shape changes upon lunch opening 
(among other things). At present, all trading models that produce these phenomena 
rely on private information. (We offer the same argument against purely inventory-
theoretic explanations of our results.) 
Before continuing, we provide a working definition of the term private 
information. Private information is information that satisfies two criteria: (1) it is 
not common knowledge and (2) it is price relevant. We consider this a natural 
definition. To clarify criterion (2), note that price relevant information is not limited 
6
 See, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), and Hong and Wang (1995). 
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to being permanent in the sense of predicting price over long horizons. Temporary 
price effects may also be predictable. Consider, for example, superior information 
relating to a temporary risk premium (like that which arises in inventory-theoretic 
models).7 This distinction is noteworthy in light of French and Roll's identifying 
assumption, which is that private information has permanent price effects whereas 
mispricing has temporary effects. (This is implicit in their comparing long-horizon 
variance with cumulative short-horizon variance: mispricing causes the latter to be 
larger). Under their assumption, however, temporary risk premia are identified as 
mispricing, an association some may find uncomfortable. 
To make the price-relevance part of our definition more concrete, we provide 
a taxonomy of private information with some examples from FX. We root the 
taxonomy in theory by considering a canonical two-period trading model in which 
trading occurs initially at price Po, then again at Pi, and then a terminal payoff F is 
realized at t=2. In this framework, we shall refer to information on the terminal 
payoff F as permanent private information.8 We offer two examples that are 
arguably permanent by this definition. The first is aggregation of information in FX 
orders that derive from real trade: a country's trade balance is a component of 
exchange rate fundamentals, and dealers receive private signals of this component 
long before published statistics are available (Lyons 1996). The second is central 
bank intervention: a dealer who receives a central bank's order has also received 
private information (Peiers 1995). 
In contrast to permanent private information, we shall refer to information 
unrelated to the payoff F but relevant to interim prices Po and Pi as temporary 
private information.9 Prices Po and Pi are a function of many arguments beyond 
7
 Temporary risk premia and the at tendant price effects are central to the inventory-theoretic branch 
of microstructure (see Ho and Stoll (1983) and O'Hara and Oldfield (1986) among many others). For 
a model of an intraday risk premium see Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995). 
8
 This information on F can take the direct form of signals of F, or can take the indirect form of 
information about the trading environment that allows one to forecast F more accurately than the 
market at large (see Madrigal 1996). 
9
 Our taxonomy highlights the temporary category for two reasons. First, we view it as relevant in 
the FX market , per our examples below. Second, the previous li terature has neglected this class of 
private information. Information-theoretic models of trading are specified with private terminal-
payoff information (our permanent category). Empirical models follow suit. It is not clear, however, 
how much of the information effect found in the data comes from this permanent category (see for 
example Hasbrouck 1988 and Madhavan and Smidt 1991). 
Note tha t our term temporary private information is not synonymous with s tandard use of 
"short-lived" private information. Short-lived private information is indeed information about 
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expectations of the payoff F. These include traders' risk aversions, traders' trading 
constraints, the supply/distribution of the risky asset, and other features of the 
trading environment. Insofar as these features affect Po or Pi without altering 
expectations of F, superior knowledge of them qualifies as temporary private 
information. Consider two examples of temporary private information in the FX 
market. The first is superior knowledge of the distribution of dealer inventories (i.e., 
the distribution of the risky asset). Because the transparency of order flow in spot 
FX is low, a dealer often has superior knowledge of her own and others' inventories. 
If inventory risk earns a risk premium, as inventory-theoretic models predict, then 
superior knowledge of this kind allows a dealer to forecast interim price more 
accurately than the market at large (i.e., as average inventory across dealers 
becomes known, this induces a change in the risk premium, which requires a change 
in price even though terminal-payoff expectations remain unchanged).10 Our 
discussions with FX dealers certainly indicate that this first example is operative. 
Risk aversion, of course, is not the only source of temporary private information. 
Our second example recognizes that even when traders share common information 
on F they may still disagree on the meaning of this information, thereby affecting Po 
or Pi. (Consider, for example, the disagreement among financial analysts about the 
direction of the stock market despite access to the same economic data). Theory 
identifies the source of this disagreement as different prior beliefs, different models, 
or both.11 Whatever the source, if one adds superior knowledge about others' beliefs 
then in this setting too one can forecast interim price more accurately than the 
market at large. In the FX market, it is a fact that dealers share their beliefs with 
terminal payoffs, with the defining feature that a public news-announcement may eliminate any 
private value to trading on it. Thus, unlike temporary private information, short-lived private 
information can predict price over long horizons, and is therefore permanent by our definition. Here 
we group short-lived and long-lived information in the same permanent category, even though these 
two sub-categories are the hear t of taxonomies elsewhere in the li terature. 
10
 This corresponds to the time-varying-expected-returns view of temporary price components (Fama 
and French 1988), with the added feature of superior knowledge of the appropriate expected re turn. 
Empirical evidence of price effects from FX inventory is provided in Lyons (1995). 
To clarify further, note that there is another traditional source of price effects from so-called 
liquidity t rades (i.e., t rades not motivated by information on F): in risk-neutral models with 
asymmetric-information, liquidity t rades affect the signal extracted from order flow, thereby affecting 
expectations and price. Superior knowledge of the liquidity trade in this case allows one to est imate 
F more accurately than the market (as in Madrigal 1996). It therefore qualifies as permanent private 
information by our definition. 
11
 See for example Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian (1985), Harris and Raviv (1993), Kan del and 
Pearson (1995), and Kraus and Smith (1994). 
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certain other dealers, but do so rather selectively. Any price implications are likely 
to be temporary. 
There are two branches of the empirical literature that closely relate to this 
paper. The first branch addresses the volatility effects of closure, though in markets 
other than FX. French and Roll (1986) on the closure of the NYSE is the seminal 
work in this branch. Other relevant papers include Barclay, Litzenberger, and 
Warner (1990), Amihud and Mendelson (1991), and Ito and Lin (1992). Barclay et 
al. examine weekend return volatility on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), exploit-
ing a phase-out of half-day trading on Saturday. They show that weekend volatility 
fell after the phase-out. Regrettably, one cannot rule out public information as the 
cause: during the same period, Saturday announcements and other market activities 
were also phased out. Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Ito and Lin (1992) also 
examine the TSE, but their focus is the lunch closure. Here again, one cannot 
control for the flow of public information: there was no change in lunch regime on 
the TSE so inferences are necessarily limited. Amihud and Mendelson show, among 
other things, that lunch volatility is significantly lower than in the morning and 
afternoon. They attribute this to "trading and the associated process of information 
dissemination", without being able to discriminate public from private information. 
Ito and Lin (1992) compare lunch volatility on the TSE with that on the NYSE, 
which does not break for lunch. They find the lunch dip in volatility is much deeper 
in Tokyo than in New York and attribute this to the suspension of trading. Turning 
now to the second branch of related empirical work, this branch addresses volatility 
patterns in the FX market and emphasizes the transmission of volatility across 
trading centers and time.12 A central result is that volatility propagates from one 
trading center to the next — the so-called "meteor shower" effect (e.g., a volatile 
Tokyo market is followed by a volatile New York market). 
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section I summarizes the 
hypotheses we test. Section II describes the data. Section III presents our results. 
And Section IV concludes. 
12
 See, e.g., Engle, Ito, and Lin (1990), Baillie and Bollerslev (1991), Dacorogna et al. (1993), and 
Hogan and Melvin (1994). 
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I. Testable Hypotheses 
I.A. Stage 1: French-Roll analysis of lunch volatility 
The first stage of our analysis follows French and Roll (1986). First, we test 
whether FX volatility is caused solely by public information. To do this, we test 
whether the introduction of trading affects lunch volatility. If volatility is caused 
solely by public information then volatility will not be affected since the flow of 
public information did not change. Summarizing our first hypothesis: 
HI: Volatility in the FX market is caused solely by public information. 
Test: 
where V[ and V[ are the yen/dollar return variances over the lunch period (12:00-
1:30 Tokyo time) for the closed and open regimes, respectively. The closed regime is 
the period before removal of the trading restriction (i.e., before December 22, 1994). 
The open regime is the period after removal of the restriction. 
Since rejecting HI is consistent with both private information and mispric-
ing, discriminating between them requires additional evidence. Stage two of our 
analysis generates the additional evidence from the changing pattern of volatility 
over the day. French and Roll, in contrast, use a different sort of evidence. Theirs 
derives from an identifying assumption: mispricing has temporary effects on price 
while private information has permanent effects. To operationalize this, they 
decompose the return in period t, Rt, into two components, an information compo-
nent It and an error component Et: 
(1) 
where the error component includes both pricing error and measurement error (they 
explicitly link the latter to bid-ask bounce). Since the error component's effect on 
price is temporary, the variance of returns over long holding periods reflects only the 
information component, whereas the cumulated variance over short subintervals 
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includes both components. Letting V, denote the return variance over the long 
holding period and V8 denote the cumulated variance over short sub intervals, 1-
Vj/V, provides an upper bound on the fraction of variance from mispricing (it is an 
upper bound because V(Et) includes the effect of bid-ask bounce).13 
French and Roll find that in the stock market, the upper bound on the fraction of 
variance from mispricing is about 12 percent. (This is based on a long holding-
period of six months and a short subinterval of one day). 
Though insightful, the French-Roll method for distinguishing mispricing from 
private information has its shortcomings. Both parts of their identifying assumption 
are open to question. One part requires that private information's effects on price 
are permanent; from the introduction, however, there are classes of private informa-
tion whose price effects are only temporary. In this instance their method overesti-
mates the role of mispricing (at least, conditional on our definition of private 
information). Perhaps more problematic is the other part of their identifying 
assumption, which requires that mispricing's effects are temporary (dissipate within 
six months). It is possible, however, that mispricing is so persistent that it becomes 
indistinguishable from fundamental value (e.g., Summers 1986 and Fama and 
French 1988). In this instance their method may underestimate mispricing (since 
their six-month holding-period does not span the multiple-year mean reversion in 
the data; see Fama and French 1988). The sign of the all-in bias is unclear. 
In light of the difficulty of interpreting the bound's level, here we address in-
stead how opening trade changes the bound. This allows us to exploit information in 
the regime shift more fully. (Note that French and Roll's measured bound does not 
utilize their closure experiment in any way.) A rise in the bound is easily rational-
ized by greater mispricing: opening trade both raises lunch variance and the fraction 
13
 This measure requires, of course, tha t the components are uncorrelated. Note also that , though our 
FX data are not plagued by the bid-ask bounce generated from transactions data, our price series 
may still include shading due to inventory control. And since the prices are input by different banks, 
this might induce a similar temporary bounce in the return series. 
due to mispricing. A fall, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the no-private -
information null: under this null the variance of the information component, V(It), 
is not changing since private information does not exist and the flow of public 
information is unchanged across regimes; it is thus impossible for total lunch 
variance to increase with a falling fraction due to the error component Et since the 
change in total variance can only come from Et. 
LB. Stage 2: Identifying private information from changes in the intraday U-shape 
The second stage of our analysis discriminates between private information 
and mispricing by examining volatility changes in the morning and afternoon. 
Specifically, from private-information-based theory we generate predictions for how 
intraday volatility responds to market opening. Since models of mispricing do not 
make the same predictions, if the predictions are borne out then this indicates 
private information is present. 
The first hypothesis we test in stage two draws on the way private informa-
tion is commonly modeled (see Admati and Pfleiderer 1988, among many others). In 
particular, because the amount of private information does not change when trading 
rules change, the result is that price impact is merely redistributed over time: 
H2: If private information is revealed by trades then opening over lunch will 
flatten the volatility U-shape. 
where VM and VA are the yen/dollar return variances over the morning and 
afternoon trading periods, respectively (as above, superscripts denote closed versus 
open regimes and the subscript L denotes lunch). Note tha t this is a joint test: a 
rejection may reflect changes in the amount of private information ra ther than 
evincing a lack of private information (making it more conservative as a test of 
whether private information is present). 
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Another prediction of private-information models relates to the morning. In 
particular, if trading is restricted over lunch then a morning-period U-shape should 
be present.14 Moreover, this morning U-shape should disappear when the restriction 
is lifted (see the closure models of Hong and Wang 1995 and Slezak 1994). 
H3: If private information is revealed by trades then morning volatility will be U-
shaped when trading is restricted over lunch and this U-shape will disappear 
when the restriction is lifted. 
where VEM, V^, and VlM are the yen/dollar return variances over the early-
morning, mid-morning, and late-morning trading periods, respectively. The last 
relation comes from the full-day U-shape that emerges after the lunch opening. 
Our fourth hypothesis addresses the horizon over which private information 
is privately valuable. Note that the duration of private value is distinct from 
whether information is temporary or permanent: even permanent private informa-
tion can have short-lived private value if, for example, others share the same 
information (since it can be rapidly reflected in price due to competition between the 
informed; see Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992). Thus, there is no clean mapping 
between type of private information and duration of private value (the latter being 
determined by the timing of price effects). And since here we examine price effects 
only, we are unable to test for specific types of private information directly. 
The test we perform determines whether private information is of long-lived 
private value. The well-known model of Kyle (1985) provides a nice example of long-
lived private value: in that model the informed trader chooses to trade over time 
such that his information is reflected in price evenly. Accordingly, here we test 
14
 Since the largest of the FX trading centers, London, is on line at the time of the Tokyo close, one 
cannot expect an analogous U-shape in the afternoon. 
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whether the opening of trade tilts the volatility U-shape. Under the long-lived null, 
opening trade should not affect morning volatility relative to afternoon. 
H4: If the private value of information revealed by trades is long-lived, then 
opening over lunch will not tilt the volatility U-shape. 
where, again, VM and VA are the return variances over the morning and afternoon 
trading periods, respectively. The alternative of short-lived private value predicts 
the U-shape will tilt upward. To see this, consider private information that may 
become common knowledge via public news. Then an open lunch tilts the U-shape 
upward because it reduces the incentive to trade early: it reduces the likelihood that 
price will reflect the information before a position can be opened. (It is precisely this 
feature that drives the private-information model of Foster and Viswanathan 
(1990).) 
I.C. A test of robustness 
The Tokyo experiment is not a pure regime shift (closed to open) since there 
were alternative markets where Tokyo dealers could route trades during the ninety-
minute break (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore).17 Thus, depth in yen/dollar did fall 
sharply over the break, but did not go to zero. If depth had gone to zero our tests 
would be more powerful. They are not biased, however, by non-zero depth. 
There is a way to measure this power loss, and at the same time check the 
robustness of our test of lunch volatility. Note that the ratio of yen/dollar trading to 
mark/dollar trading in Tokyo is much higher than in Singapore or Hong Kong (data 
in next section). This relative importance provides a way to measure the importance 
of Singapore and Hong Kong as alternative trading venues. Per above, the power of 
our test depends on the degree to which depth drops from the Tokyo break. Taking 
11 
Tokyo off line causes a much sharper drop in the depth of yen/dollar than in the 
depth of mark/dollar (since Tokyo trading is far more yen/dollar intensive). Thus, 
though we expect the effect of lunch opening on volatility in these two currencies to 
have the same sign, the effect should be larger in the case of yen/dollar. Summa-
rizing our fifth hypothesis and test, we have: 
H5: If private information is revealed by trades then opening over lunch will 
increase mark/dollar volatility, but by less than yen/dollar volatility. 
Vj(DM) VT° 
Test: V[(DM) < VL°(DM) and f^f) < J[ 
where VL (DM) is the return variance of the mark/dollar rate over the lunch period. 
II. Data 
II.A. Exchange rate data 
The yen/dollar and mark/dollar rates we use are the indicative spot quotes 
posted on Reuters FXFX between 29 September 1994 and 28 March 1995, the first 
and last dates of our longest sampling interval. (One of our robustness tests, 
described in the next subsection, makes use of an additional sub-sample of FXFX 
quotes from 29 September 1995 to 22 December 1995.) Our source for these series 
is Olsen & Associates Research Institute for Applied Economics, in Zurich. Each 
bid-offer quote is time stamped to the second. The results we report are based on 
data with a periodicity of one minute, constructed by taking the prior quote closest 
to each minute.16 
15
 Japanese newspapers report tha t there was indeed migration of lunch-hour trading to Hong Kong 
and Singapore before the restriction was abolished. 
16
 It is well-known tha t the Reuters FXFX data contain significant noise tha t can be reduced by 
sampling at fixed time intervals. See Zhou (1996) for an analysis of this issue. Note that , for 
example in our 20-day sample, there are an average of 15.3 raw quotes per daily 12:00-1:30 interval 
in the before sample and 39.8 quotes in the after sample. For more detail on the capture and 
cleaning of the raw data, see Dacorogna et al. (1993). For more on their indicative nature , see 
Goodhart (1989) and Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1996). 
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Though the indicative quotes have their shortcomings, our method of use 
minimizes our exposure. Specifically, the variance ratios require only the exchange 
rate series themselves (bid-offer midpoint). This is the dimension of the data that 
Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1996) find provides the most accurate measure of the 
real-market analogue (in contrast to the spread series and the volume series, where 
the latter is proxied by the frequency of quote entry). 
II.B. Accounting for the Seasonal 
There is a complication that derives from the date of the regulatory change 
(December 22). Traditionally, the Christmas week is one of the least representative 
since most businesses and currency dealers take vacation (from just before Christ-
mas through New Year's day). Hence, a standard before-versus-after comparison is 
not a clean test because there is a strong seasonal in the holiday period following the 
change in regime. 
We use two methods to correct for this seasonal. With the first, we omit from 
the after sample the business days between December 22 and January 2. (This is 
the correction used for our reported results.) The second compares before and after 
results over intervals exactly one year apart. Though this clearly eliminates the 
seasonal, the resulting larger gap between the sub-samples introduces other factors 
that are difficult to control. In any case, lunch volatility is significantly higher in 
the after sample using this method as well. 
We offer an additional fact that is inconsistent with the possibility that the 
doubling of lunch variance in the after sample is due to a seasonal or other spurious 
factor (e.g., an ARCH innovation).17 In general, these factors would cause volatility 
to rise equally over the whole trading day. But we find sharp changes in the 
intraday pattern, with the variance in some sub-intervals significantly lower in the 
after sample. (Further, this falling-variance fact works against mispricing as the 
cause of higher lunch variance: it is unclear why larger errors over lunch should 
induce smaller errors in the morning or afternoon.) 
17
 One possible concern is the Hanshin earthquake, which occurred on 17 Janua ry 1995. For the 
exchange rate , however, the earthquake was a non-event: there is no evidence tha t daily or weekly 
volatility of the yen/dollar rate increased on the day or in the wake of the earthquake. 
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II.C. Trading Volume in Tokyo and other Asian markets 
In Asia, three major trading centers compete for business in an almost 
identical time zone: Tokyo, Singapore, and Hong Kong. According to the tri-annual 
survey of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the daily turnover of these 
three markets in the month of April 1995 was $161 billion, $105 billion, and $90 
billion, respectively.18 Yen/dollar trading accounts for 76% of turnover in Tokyo 
($122 billion), but accounts for only 29% in Hong Kong ($26 billion). 19 Assuming 
that Singapore is similar to Hong Kong in its currency composition, Tokyo clearly 
dominates yen/dollar trading with a share of more than two-thirds of the combined 
market. Consequently, the absence of Tokyo-based orders has a substantive effect 
on the depth of the yen/dollar market. In contrast, the mark/dollar market in Asia 
is more equally divided among the three trading centers. The share of mark/dollar 
transactions is only 12% in Tokyo ($19 billion) versus 25% in Hong Kong ($23 
billion). Assuming, again, that Singapore and Hong Kong are similar in currency 
composition, the Tokyo share of the combined mark/dollar market is less than one-
third. 
Data on transactions volume provide evidence that the lunch-hour restriction 
in Tokyo was effective.20 Daily interbank volume in Tokyo increased by roughly 30 
percent after the opening of lunch-hour trade (an increase that is significant at the 1 
percent level for all three of our sampling intervals.) To clarify why it was effective, 
note that by law all FX orders in Japan must be intermediated by authorized 
currency-dealing banks (a requirement to this day under the so-called Foreign 
Exchange Law). Further, all of these authorized currency-dealing banks were 
subject to the lunch-hour trading restriction. Though customer orders received by 
authorized dealing banks over lunch could be transmitted overseas and executed, 
customers could not place orders with overseas dealers directly (here, by customer 
we mean any participant without currency-dealing authorization). 
18
 These are net turnovers in the sense that they are adjusted for double counting. 
19
 Singapore does not report the currency composition to the BIS. 
20
 Transaction volume data for the spot FX market are in general not available beyond the t r i -annual 
snapshot provided by the BIS survey (month of April only). The Tokyo interbank market is an 
exception since the Bank of Japan collects these data daily. They do not collect the da ta on an 
intraday basis however. 
14 
III. Results and Discussion 
III.A. Stage 1 results: Lunch volatility effects 
Hypothesis 1 addresses whether lunch volatility changes after the opening of 
trade (i.e., after the removal of the restriction on 22 December 1994). To test this 
we calculate lunch variance when the market is open relative to that when closed, 
and test whether this ratio exceeds one. 
Table I presents the results. The first column is the number of trading days 
in both the closed and open samples (i.e., the before and after samples). For 
example, the dates of the 20 day before sample are the weekdays from November 24 
to December 21, 1994 and the dates of the 20 day after sample are the weekdays 
from January 4, 1995 to January 31, 1995 (holiday week omitted—see section II). 
Note that 20 trading days corresponds roughly to one trading month. The second 
column presents the variance ratios, open to closed. The variance ratios are 
calculated from returns measured as the change in the log of the bid-offer midpoint 
over all days in the sample. (Note that the usual small sample bias that plagues 
equity market studies is irrelevant here: the number of one-minute observations in 
our shortest sample period of 20 days is 1,799.) P-values for the null that the 
variance ratio equals one are not included because in all three cases they are zero to 
two decimal places (i.e., less than 0.5%). 
These results are strong evidence that lunch volatility does indeed rise with 
the opening of trade. In fact, return variance roughly doubles. This is a clear 
rejection of the null that volatility in FX is caused solely by public information. 
We turn now to changes in the French-Roll bound on variance from pricing 
errors. When calculated from our before sample (i.e., closed) the resulting bound 
over the lunch hour is 80 percent. In the after sample (i.e., open) the resulting 
lunch-hour bound is lower, only 37 percent.21 Given that total lunch variance goes 
up with the regime shift, the fall in this bound is inconsistent with the no-private-
21
 The numerator in our calculation of V{ I Vs is the actual variance of the lunch-period re turn 
(12:00-1:30) over 60 trading days (about 3 months) for both the closed and open samples. The 
denominator is the variance of the lunch-period return implied by the squared changes in one-minute 
re turns . Per section I, whether this type of calculation constitutes an upper bound is open to 
question, particularly since we use a shorter long holding-period than did French and Roll. Accord-
ingly, we refrain from use of the modifier upper. Note tha t our inference here, based on changes in 
the bound, is not dependent on this being an upper bound. 
15 
information null: under this null the variance of the information component, V(It), 
is not changing (private information does not exist and public information flow is 
unchanged across regimes); since the increase in total variance must then come from 
the error component Et, it is not possible that the fraction of variance from the error 
component Et simultaneously falls.22 
III.B. Stage 2 results: The pattern of volatility over the day 
Stage 2 of our analysis examines whether private information is present in 
the FX market by testing hypotheses H2-H5, all of which involve the U-shape of 
intraday volatility and how it is affected by the opening. To begin, Figure 1 provides 
a graphical overview of the effect on volatility over the day. It illustrates clearly the 
doubling of variance over lunch. The figure also foreshadows our results on the 
flattening and tilting of the U-shape (H2 and H4, respectively). 
Our second hypothesis, H2, posits that opening lunch-hour trade will flatten 
the volatility U-shape if private information is revealed by trades. Table II presents 
our results. This table presents relative variance ratios for the yen/dollar rate over 
three intraday periods: morning, lunch, and afternoon (10:30-12:00, 12:00-1:30, and 
1:30-3:00 Tokyo time, respectively). The second column presents the Lunch-to-
morning variance ratio after opening relative to the lunch-to-morning variance ratio 
before opening. The third column presents the lunch-to-afternoon variance ratio 
after opening relative to the lunch-to-afternoon variance ratio before opening. P-
values for the ratio=l null are zero to two decimal places for the component variance 
ratios (i.e., less than 0.5%). 
The results demonstrate a flattening of the U-shape. To see this, note that 
the denominators imply that lunch variance is substantially less than both morning 
and afternoon variance in the closed sample (i.e., the before sample). After trade is 
opened, however, lunch variance rises relative to both morning and afternoon 
variance (numerators > denominators in all cases). Because the numerators remain 
less than one, the U-shaped curve is not flattened completely.23 
22
 For comparison, the morning bounds are statistically indistinguishable across the closed and open 
samples (roughly 60 percent); the same is true of the afternoon bounds (roughly 70 percent). 
23
 Though lunch variance doubles, variance over the whole day increases far less: the variance over all 
three trading periods increases by roughly 20% (which is significant at the 1 percent level). 
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Our third hypothesis addresses what is perhaps the strongest prediction of 
the private-information models. It posits that if private information is revealed by 
trades then morning volatility will be U-shaped when trading is restricted over 
lunch and this U-shape will disappear when the restriction is lifted. This prediction 
too is borne out in the data. Though statistically none of the relations expressed in 
the test of H3 can be rejected, in lieu of reporting them we present this result with a 
figure, Figure 2. The figure presents the estimated variance for four one-hour 
morning periods, both before and after the opening of lunch-hour trade. Note the 
pronounced variance increase in the hour preceding the lunch break (11-12 Tokyo 
time). Once lunch-hour trade opens, however, this variance peak vanishes, and the 
familiar full-day U-shape appears. 
Our fourth hypothesis addresses whether the intraday volatility curve tilts 
with the opening of lunch-hour trade. Under the null that the private value of 
information revealed by trades is long-lived, opening over lunch will not cause a tilt 
(i.e., it will have no effect on incentives to trade early versus late). 
Table III presents the result: the curve does indeed exhibit a significant up-
ward tilt. Column two presents the morning variance ratio. Column three presents 
the afternoon variance ratio. Note from column two the evidence that morning 
variance actually falls slightly after opening lunch-hour trade. The afternoon 
variance, in contrast, clearly rises after opening lunch-hour trade. This upward tilt 
of the volatility curve is consistent with information whose private value is short-
lived (whether this reflects private information that is temporary cannot be deter-
mined from these results). 
Our test of hypothesis 5 is a test of whether mark/dollar volatility also rises 
over lunch, but by less than the rise of yen/dollar volatility. Recall that this 
implication comes from alternative trading venues being available during the Tokyo 
market closure. We expect a smaller rise in mark/dollar volatility because 
mark/dollar is relatively unimportant in Tokyo, implying a smaller effect from 
bringing Tokyo back on line. 
The result (not reported) is the following: dollar/mark volatility also rises 
significantly, but by less than yen/dollar. For example, in our 20 day sample the 
yen/dollar open/closed variance ratio is more than double the mark/dollar ratio, even 
17 
though the mark/dollar ratio shows an increase that is significant at the 1 percent 
level. Thus, the prediction in hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected, providing further 
evidence that our experiment is robust.24 
III.C. Some Perspective on the Results 
Though not exhaustive, we offer three characterizations the spot yen-dollar 
market. One polar view regards it as wholly driven by public information, with a 
large number of participants (large in a convergence sense). Under these conditions 
risk sharing is complete and order flow has no price impact since it is purely 
allocational (inventory effects on price are thus also ruled out). Opening trade in 
Tokyo would not affect volatility in this case. Our results do not support this view 
(though it is arguably predominant among open-economy macroeconomists). 
A second view admits a role for private information — either permanent or 
temporary — but attributes the drop in trading over the closed lunch to fewer 
allocational trades in Tokyo, with informational trades being routed to Hong Kong 
or Singapore. Under this view the opening of lunch-hour trade would have little 
impact on volatility since the lunch closing does not affect informational trading 
(any impact would have to come from a changing share of informational order flow). 
In this case, though private information is present, our test would have little power 
to detect it. Our results do not support this view either. 
A third view also admits a role for private information, but in contrast to the 
second it attributes the drop in trading over the closed lunch hour to fewer informa-
tional trades. For example, the informed may delay trades because trading costs 
outside Tokyo are increased by illiquidity or unfamiliarity with counterparties. This 
reduction in the lunch-hour trading of the informed reduces lunch volatility. This 
third view is consistent with our results. 
24
 Upon reflection, Hong Kong and Singapore provide an additional argument tha t supports the 
private-information hypothesis. The argument rests on the fact tha t dealers in these other markets 
are less familiar with Tokyo-based customers and their motives for trade. Therefore, as Tokyo-based 
t rade is diverted to these markets, these dealers are less efficient at signal extraction, and thus more 
prone to mistakes in inference. These mistakes increase mispricing in the closed portion of the 
sample relative to the open portion. They are therefore the wrong sign for explaining the doubling of 
lunch variance when moving from closed to open. 
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IV. Conclusions 
The case for private information in the FX market rests mainly on four facts. 
The first fact is that opening trade causes the bound on mispricing's share in 
variance to fall. This is inconsistent with a null of no private information and no 
change in public information: under this null the only possible source of higher lunch 
variance is mispricing, but this would cause the bound to rise, not fall. Facts two 
through four strengthen the case considerably since they are predicted by the 
relevant asymmetric-information theory. Moreover, we are unaware of any model of 
mispricing that can account for them. Fact two is that opening trade causes the full-
day volatility U-shape to flatten, a natural result of informative trades being 
reallocated to the lunch hour. Fact three is that opening trade causes the full-day 
U-shape to tilt upward, an implication of information whose private value is short-
lived. Finally, fact four is that the lunch break produces a morning U-shape, and 
opening trade causes that morning U-shape to disappear. This is perhaps the most 
compelling single fact of the four. 
In our judgment, then, the view that FX traders project exclusively on public 
information needs to be relaxed (or, alternatively, the view that they interpret 
public information the same way needs to be relaxed). Relaxing this view is eased 
by recognizing that private information can be price relevant without predicting 
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Morning Volatility: Before and After 
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Lunch-Hour Yen/Dollar Variance Ratio 
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Does Lunch-Hour Trading Flatten the U-Shape? 
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Table HI 
Does Lunch-Hour Trading T i lt the U-Shape? 
This table presents the return variance ratio for the yen/dollar rate over the morning and 
afternoon periods (10:30-12:00 and 1:30-3:00 Tokyo time, respectively). The numerator of 
the ratio is the return variance after the lunch-hour market opened (i.e., after December 22, 
1994); the denominator is the return variance before the opening. The returns are calcu-
lated as the change in the log of the bid-offer midpoint. The left-hand column describes the 
before and after samples. For example, the dates of the 20 day before sample are the 
weekdays from November 24 to December 21, 1994 and the dates of the 20 day after sample 
are the weekdays from January 4, 1995 to January 31, 1995 (holiday week omitted). The 
second column presents the variance ratio for the morning period. The third column 
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